Russian Adaptation and Mitigation to Climate Change

I think the most interesting thing about adaptation to climate change in Europe, and therefore possibly Russia, concerns agriculture. Introducing new crops to the Northern European areas might be one possible adaptation (IPCC AR4). Crops that are more resistant to drought for example (IPCC AR4). However in areas such as Russia, the lack of fertility in the local soil may limit this adaptive capability (IPCC AR4).

Russia has signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1999, ratified it in 2004, and has seen it gone into effect in 2005 (UNFCCC). Russia acknowledges that significant consequences will be faced to its national development if the protocol is not ratified (UNFCCC).  As a party that has signed the Kyoto Protocol, Russia was required to reduce carbon emissions.

Russia has a lot of potential for renewable energy. However, renewable energy is just 1% of current Russian output (Russia Today). This low number is due to Russia’s large amounts of oil, gas and coal energy sources (Russia Today). Wind power is one possible solution. There are new wind power projects, and these will add about 276 megawatts of energy to the nation’s capability (Russia Today). Geothermal is also being expanded to 120 megawatts from 80 megawatts (Russia Today).

I think that although both mitigation and adaptation strategies are important, adaptation should be Russia’s primary goal. Mitigation will only be effective if all or most countries agree to tackle climate change. This may not be guaranteed. Thus, Russia should focus on adapting to rising seas levels, increasing temperatures, and drought.

Climate Change Impacts

The IPCC recently released their report on climate change for each continent.  As the Russian population density is greatest in Europe (World Population review), the several results for this continent are most relevant.

There are many projections of future climate conditions in Europe as predicted by climate models.  The overall projection is that the European continent will warm faster than the global average (IPCC 11.3), and thus, western Russia as well.  Average precipitation is, however, expected to vary, it will most likely be greater for Northern Europe and less for the Mediterranean on a yearly basis (IPCC 11.3).  As such, it is assumed that drier climates and drought is likely for the Mediterranean region (IPCC 11.3).  The precipitation in Northern Europe is also expected to increase in intensity, and the frequency of these events would also increase (IPCC 11.3.3.4).  These events might occur in major Russian population centers.  Snowfall, and the season that this precipitation is expected, is projected to shorten, and the depth of the snow cover is expected is expected to decrease as well (IPCC 11.3.3.7).  As the snow cover in Europe is reduced, it will likely initiate a positive feedback, enhancing warming effects by decreasing the albedo (IPCC 11.3.1).  The temperature increase in Europe is projected to be largest in the winter months, (IPCC 11.3.3.1) thus Russia could see much milder winters .  Many of these effects concern Northern Europe, where a great portion of the Russian population resides.

The negative effects of the climate change in Europe are numerous.  The increased risk of flash flooding, on the coast and inland areas are among these effects (IPCC SPM).  Since Russia is expected to see more precipitation, it could most likely face these problems.  Glaciers will most likely recede in the mountains regions and snow cover will decrease (IPCC SPM).  This, as previously stated, could increase the feedback for Russia’s climate system, driving the temperature up.  Precipitation is likely to be reduced in the summer months in East Europe, and drought in Southern Europe is expected (IPCC SPM).  In Northern Europe, there are many varied effects good and bad.  The reduced need for heating as temperature increases is a positive effect, (IPCC SPM) and as a result, Russian citizens might experience smaller heating costs.  There are also several key risks associated with climate change in Europe.  One such risk, as previously mentioned, is from flooding near rivers and along coastlines.  This risk is driven by extreme precipitation events and rising sea levels (IPCC AR5 SPM).  Another such risk is that of water restrictions and decreasing availability.  This risk is caused by increasing temperatures and dryness (IPCC AR5 SPM).  Another such risk is that of extreme heat on the populace.  This risk is made more prevalent by increasing temperatures (IPCC AR5 SPM), and Russia may see these problems as its temperature increases.  All of these risks are in the medium risk range for the present and near term, however, they increase to very high in the long term (IPCC AR5 SPM).

Overall, numerous changes in climate, and the effects of those changes, are expected in Europe.  The precipitation and temperature changes have already been described above with general warming as well increasing precipitation trends (IPCC Final Draft).  The severity and number of heat waves across Europe is likely to increase (IPCC Final Draft).  These extreme temperatures may affect anything from the health of the populace to crop production (IPCC Final Draft).  As stated earlier, sea level rise and increased precipitation will most likely increase the flood risk, and may damage culturally relevant buildings (IPCC Final Draft).  Crop production may actually be increased in Northern Europe, however irrigation needs may be increased (IPCC Final Draft), and the Russian population may have to face this requirement in the near future.  Flora and fauna are most likely to be greatly affected by these changes as well, as habitats shrink and shift in location (IPCC Final Draft).

Among all the possible threats presented to Russia due to climate change, I think that the most interesting ones are the changes related to rivers and sea levels.  The surrounding sea temperature for Russia is expected to rise by as much as 5 degrees Celsius in the next century (Advanced Review).  This might also be tied to a higher sea level in the southern parts of Russia (Advanced Review).  As such, buildings might have to be moved or strengthened because of this effect (Advanced Review).  There is also the possibility of decreased flow rate of rivers in southern Russia as well, and this may be tied in to an expected lowering in the amount of water resources available to the population (Advanced Review).  As a result, rationing water may have to be put into effect, and the enlarging of rivers channels for greater flow rate (Advanced Review).  The lack of water supply may also be linked to the droughts expected to arise in the next century as well.  For this case as well, rationing water may have to be instituted (Advanced Review).

Russia’s Contribution to Climate Change

The former Imperial Russia, the U.S.S.R., and the modern day Russian Federation sees a slight increase in total carbon emissions from about 1900 to 1916.  After this date, the amount of emissions drops to a low value (CDIAC Carbon Emissions).  The value then increases in the late 1920s at a pretty significant rate. This increasing trend continues until the early 1940s.  The value then drops slightly (CDIAC Carbon Emissions).  After this drop, the value continues to rise until about 1990.  This peak value reaches almost 1.2 million thousand metric tons of carbon (CDIAC Carbon Emissions).  After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russian total emissions dropped significantly, to about half their peak value, about 450,000 thousand metric tons (CDIAC Carbon Emissions).  These levels have remained fairly consistent until 2010.  The solid emissions are consistently greater than the liquid emissions, except from about 1980 to 1992.  These levels rise consistently from around 1900 until around 1990, where they plateau.  The gas emissions are near or at zero until the late 1950s.  These values then rise steadily until around 1990 where it also plateaus as well (CDIAC Carbon Emissions).

The Soviet Union begins emitting large amounts of CO2 in the late 1920s.  This value decreases slightly in the early 1940s, and then increases again in the late 1940s significantly (CDIAC Carbon Emissions).  This could correspond with the start of World War two with the U.S.S.R.’s entry in 1941 (geographia.com).  Military activity and preparedness leading up to WWII increased as industry was converted to a military nature from civil projects (geographia.com).  The second increase might correspond to the start of the Cold War at the end of WWII as the U.S.S.R. concentrated on heavy industry and projects of a military nature (geographia.com).

Russia’s most recent (2010) per capita value for metric tons of carbon per person is 3.32, while the U.S. per capita value is 4.71 (CDIAC Carbon Emissions).  This results in 70.5% of Russian to U.S. per capita emissions.  This value is lower than the U.S. value because Russian emissions are currently less than half that of U.S. values (CDIAC Carbon Emissions).

The Russian per capita rank is currently 22nd globally (CDIAC Per Capita Rank).  This is lower than the U.S. rank of 12th (CDIAC Per Capita Rank).

In my personal opinion, I feel that the per capita Russian rank of 22nd is quite good despite it being a world power.

Total_Fossil_Fuel_Emissions

Total Fossil Fuel Emissions by Nation (http://rowdy.msudenver.edu/~wagnerri/Emissions_data.xlsx)

The U.S.S.R. and Russia’s total emissions rise steadily along with that of the U.S., but is not as high.  This trend continues until around 1990, when Russian emissions drop significantly (http://rowdy.msudenver.edu/~wagnerri/Emissions_data.xlsx).  China’s emissions rise along with those of the U.S.S.R. but however, increase at a far greater rate after the year 2000, far exceeding Russia’s current values.  India’s current output now exceeds Russia’s, and Japan’s values come close to matching it (http://rowdy.msudenver.edu/~wagnerri/Emissions_data.xlsx).  Russian output still greatly exceeds that of Brazilian current output (http://rowdy.msudenver.edu/~wagnerri/Emissions_data.xlsx).

As of 2010, the country with largest emissions of carbon dioxide is China.

As of the current (2010) data, per capita, the U.S. has higher carbon emissions than China.  The U.S. value is 4.71 vs. the Chinese value of 1.68 (CDIAC Carbon Emissions).  As such, a U.S. citizen is responsible for more emission of carbon than a Chinese citizen.

Cumulatively, the nation responsible for the most carbon emissions is the U.S.  This value is 96,955,492 thousand metric tons of carbon.  This value obviously exceeds the U.S.S.R. & Russia’s value of 39,410,719, China’s value of 36,152,087, Japan’s value of 13,247,714, India’s value of 10,260,070, and Brazil’s value of 2,983,173 (http://rowdy.msudenver.edu/~wagnerri/Emissions_data.xlsx).

The percentage of Chinese to U.S. cumulative emission of carbon is 37.3%.  The percentage of Indian to U.S. total emission is 10.6% (http://rowdy.msudenver.edu/~wagnerri/Emissions_data.xlsx).

If the Keeling curve is compared to the total global emissions of carbon, it is obvious that the graphs, while both showing an upward trend, are not the same shape.  The total emissions curve increases in an almost exponential fashion, while the Keeling curve appears fairly linear in nature (http://rowdy.msudenver.edu/~wagnerri/Keeling.xlsx).  Carbon emissions are the amount being put into the atmosphere, while concentrations are the amount of carbon currently in the atmosphere.  The concentration of carbon in the atmosphere is the rate of emission balanced by the rate of removal from the atmosphere (CO2Now).  Even if emissions were completely eliminated, the concentration of atmospheric carbon would decrease slowly because of its long lifetime in the air, only about 40 ppm over the next century (CO2Now).